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The Inclusion of Disjunction in Child Grammar: Evidence from Modal Verbs
Andrea Gualmini, Luisa Meroni and Stephen Crain
University of Maryland at College Park

1.

Introduction

This study is concerned with the acquisition of the disjunction operator. or, in English.
Two mutually inconsistent claims have been made about the acquisition of disjunction.
One claim is that the acquisition of the adult truth conditions for logical connectives,
including disjunction, is a late and not fully universal, achievement. With particular
reference to disjunction, the findings from several studies are interpreted as showing that
only the truth conditions associated with exclusive-or are available to young children
(e.g., Beilin and Lust 1975; Braine and Rumain 1981, 1983; Paris 1973). There is a
related claim, that even when children respond as if they have access to a broader range
of truth conditions, namely those associated with inclusive-or, children's adult-like
responses are the result of a failure to distinguish or from and (paris 1973).
A different conclusion was reached in a recent study by Chierchia, Crain, Guasti
and Thornton (1998), who conducted a series of experiments which revealed children's
adult-like knowledge of logical connectives, including disjunction. To reconcile the
findings from the Chierchia et ai. study and those of previous research. Chierchia et aI.
(1998) draw upon a distinction between semantic and pragmatic knowledge. They argue
that the acquisition of logical connectives is simply a process of mapping the appropriate
truth conditions (associated with logical connectives in classical logic) onto the particular
words of the language to which the child is exposed. In understanding sentences,
however, children are also influenced by the pragmatic norms they follow. In many
We thank several people who helped us in the design and execution of the experiments, as well as
the analysis and interpretation of the data: Mari Broman Olsen, Gennaro Chierchia, Maria Teresa Guasti,
Fred Savarese, Bonnie Schwanz and, especially, Rosalind Thornton. We also thank the teachen, staff and
children at the Center for Young Children of the University of Maryland at College Park where the
experiments were: conducted.
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contexts, the use of or is felicitous only on the exclusivc·or reading because of
conversational implicatures (see Grice 1975). In other conte:ltls, by contrast, or is
felicitous in a broader range of circumstances, i.e. those associated with the inclusive-or
reading (c.g. Chierchia and McConnell-Ginel 1990).
According to Chierchia et aI. (1998), it is unwarranted to infer from previous tasks
that children lack the inclusive-or reading. because children were tested in contexts that
raised a conversational implicature. thereby making only the exclusive-or reading
felicitous. For example, in a study by Beaine and Rumain (1981) children were asked to
«pick an X or a Y», and they generally picked either an X or a Y. but not both. This
response is consistent with the exclusive-or reading, but it is likely that this reading arises
because of a conversational implicature: if the speaker had wanted to ask the child to pick
both an X and a Y. he would have used and instead of or. Therefore, children's
preference for the exclusive-or reading does not indicate the unavailability of the truth
conditions associated with inclusive-or. Perhaps the truth conditions of inclusive-or are
available to children, but their interpretation of sentences is also influenced by pragmatic
knowledge, Le. by conversational implicatures.
As noted. however. there are contexts that suspend these implicatures, thus
making the inclusive-or reading nahlral. Using a Truth Value Judgment task, Chierchia et
al. found that children were able to assign the inclusive-or interpretation in one
implicature-erasing context, Which they called the Prediction Mode. The Prediction Mode
introduces uncertainty as to which particular outcome (out of several alternatives) will
take place. [f it is uncen.ain whether X or Y, or perhaps both, will take place, then it
becomes felicitous 10 use or, even if it turns out that both X and Y actually occur. The
conclusion reached by Chierchia et at is that children know the semantic properties of or,
and they know the relevant conversational implicatures.
Although the data from the Chierchia et a1. study support the view according 10
which connectives in adult and child language have the same meaning. there was a
possible problem with the design of the study . If children accessed the inclusive-or
reading, they were expected to respond «Yes» to the test sentences. However, in
experimental contexts that require subjects to respond «Yes» or «No». they tend to say
«Yes» if they are confused, or fail to understand a sentence. or cannot remember it (see
Grimshaw and Rosen 1990 and Crain and Thornton 1998). Therefore, it is important to
ensure, as far as possible, that children's adult-like «Yes» responses were not simply due
to their failure to comprehend or recall the test sentences. Children might have given
'correct' responses for the wrong reason in the Chierchia et a1. study. because the test
sentence was uttered before the completion of the slOry. Therefore, there was a
significant time delay between the assertion of the target sentence and its evaluation by
the child. If children forgot the test sentence during this period, this could have resulted
in adult-like «Yes» responses. A further limitation of the Chierchia et al. (1998) study
was that it did not include control sentences to show that children distinguisb between
and and or. Consequently, their data do not directly address the claims by Paris (1973).
The present study attempted to address both of these issues. I
I The acc:;eptability of the inclusive-or reading, and the distinction between and and or is also
addressed in a study reported in Qualmini, ernin and Meroni (2000). The linguistic context in the Qualmini
el al. study introduces disjunction in the antecedent of condilional sentences. To avoid the possible
methodological problems of the Chietchia et al. study, the experiment takes the form of a game in which a
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The present study consists of two experiments. using the Truth Value Judgement
task. The first experiment investigates another linguistic context in which conversational
implicatures are cancelled. namely in sentences with a generic interpretation. In such
contexts. the inclusive-or reading of disjunction should be felicitous. In addition, the
experiment was designed to overcome the possible methodological problems associated
with the Chierchia et al. study. In the present experiment, the target sentences were
uttered by the puppet upon completion of the stories, so the child was in a position to
evaluate the truth or falsity of each test sentence immediately after hearing it The second
experiment investigates a linguistic context in which the truth conditions associated with
the inclusive-or are unavailable, but not because of a conversational implicature; rather,
the reduction in truth conditions is occasioned by the linguistic content of the sentence.
This last feature of the second experiment makes the results significant for the
Modularity Matching Model (Crain and Steedman 1985; Crain and Thornton 1998; Crain
and Wexler 1998). According to this model, the language processing system has modular
architecture such that operations at lower levels of linguistic representation cannot be
influenced by operations at higher levels. Referring to the syntax/semantics interface,
Crain and Steedman (1985) propose that ((syntax proposes, semantics disposes».
Extending the model to the semanticslpragmatics interface, it follows that pragmatic
principles carmot influence semantic interpretation; pragmatic principles merely
adjudicate among alternatives that are licensed by the semantics. Preswnably. all but one
of the semantic alternatives is discarded. If only a single interpretation is licensed by the
semantics. then operating principles within the pragmatic component will not be engaged.
Therefore. the Modularity Matching Model predicts that conversational impticatures may
be preempted by semantic principles, which are executed before the perceiver attempts to
match the sentence to the extralinguistic context. The role of the pragmatics is limited to
seeing if the sentence is felicitous or not in the extralinguistic context, on the unique
semantic interpretation.

2.

Disjunction in generic sentences

A modal verb such as can may be used to express the possibility of an agent perfonrung a
certain action. As shown by Higginbotham (1991), when it is combined with or, the
modal verb can makes available the full set of truth conditions associated with
disjunction in standard logic. For example, (1) is true in each of the circumstances
described in (2).
(1)

Batman or Spiderman can finish a puzzle.

(2)

Batman can finish a jigsaw puzzle but Spiderman cannot.
Spidennan can finish ajigsaw puzzle but Batman cannot.
Batman and Spiderman can each finish ajigsaw puzzle.
Now consider (3):

(3)

lohn or Paul can lift the piano.

puppet guesses what is hidden behind the curtain of a stage; the contents of the stage arc immediately
revealed.
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In a situation in which John and Paul can lift the piano together but neither can lift
it alone, (3) is false. As this shows, disjunction is distributive; a collective reading of the
operator or is not tolerated.1 Providing a complete ex-planation oftbe contrast between (1)
and (3) is beyond the scope of this paper. Still, it is important to consider some
alternatives. Let's start by considering what makes the inclusive·or reading available in
(I).

The inclusive·or reading is available in (1) presumably because the generic
interpretation introduces a degree of uncertainty about the events that wil1 transpire in the
future: a number of eventualities make the sentence true. By contrast, in describing an

event that bas already taken place, the inclusive-or interpretation becomes less
acceptable, as illustrated in (4).
( 1)

Batman or Spiderman can ftnish a puzzle.

(4)

Batman or Spidennan fmished a puzzle.

Intuitively, (I) delineates a set of possible outcomes. There is no reason to expect
both Batman and Spiderman to finish a puzzle, but there is no reason to reject this
possibility either. By contrast, if (4) is used to describe a situation about which the
relevant details are known to the speaker, then if both Batman and Spidecman actually
ftnished a puzzle, it would be more felicitous to describe the situation using conjunction,
as in (5).
(5)

Batman and Spidecman fmished a puzzle.

Of course, (4) is also a true description of the situation described by (5), but it is
not a felicitous description, due to a conversational implicature.
Returning to (3) (repeated here as 6), there are at least two ways to explain why
this sentence does not allow the collective interpretation. First, one might invoke a
conversational implicature. On this proposal, the use of conjunction rather then
disjunction would result in a more cooperative statement.

(6)

John or Paul can lift the piano.

We see two problems with this proposal, however. First, if an implicature is
responsible for the unavailability of the collective reading, speakers should judge (6) to
be infelicitous, rather than false. Notice, however, that adding a qualifying statement to
the effect that, together, John and Bill have lifted the piano on several occasions, has no
effect on the truth value of (6). Second, if conversational implicatures are responsible for
the unacceptability of (6), then it should be possible to find a context in which
implicatures do not arise, since one of the defining properties of conversational
implicatures is that they do not arise in certain contexts, e.g., contexts of uncertainty. But
1 Throughout this paper, the tenn 'collective' is used in the same way as it is used in the literature
on ronnal semantics (see Link 1983 and Schwarzchild 1996). However, the tenn is used differently in some
studies of child language (e.g. Philip 1995, but cf. Avrutin and Thornton 1994), where it refers 10 an
interpretation in which an existential quantifier has scope over a universal quantifier.
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there is no apparent difference in the interpretation of (6) as a prediction rather than as a
description.
For these reasons, it seems mare appealing to account for the difference between
(1) and (6) by invoking grammatical principles. In particular, we will follow Chierchia
(1998), who argues that the collective interpretation of verbs places a specific restriction
on the kind of semantic objects that can be part of their denotation. Intuitively, pluralities
(e.g. entities like {a, b} in Chierchia (1998» are possible elements oftbe denotation of
verbs on a distributive reading but not on a collective reading, in which case objects like
g{a, b} are required.) Without going into detail, this provides a theoretically motivated
explanation of why the coordinated NPs in (I) and (6) result in different readings.
(I)
(6)

Batman or Spidennan can fmish a puzzle.
John or Paul can lift the piano.

To conclude, the collective interpretation is incompatible with a disjunctive noun
phrase, so sentences like (6) can only be evaluated on a distributive reading; in the
present example, assuming that neither John or Paul could lift the piano, the sentence is
false.
The next section describes two experiments that were designed to determine
whether or not children also distinguish between sentences like (1) and (6). In particular,
the first experiment was designed to establish the extent to which children (and a control
group of adults) allow the inclusive-or reading of disjunction. Following that, a second
experiment is described. This experiment was designed to detennine whether children
know that disjunction can only be assigned a distributive interpretation.

3.

Experimental Data

We present the results of two experiments using the Truth Value Judgement task. For
each experiment we will consider the results obtained with children as well as those of a
control group of adults. The children who participated in the experiments were students at
the Center for YOWlg Children at the University of Maryland at College Park; the adults
were undergraduates at the same university.
The Truth Value Judgement task is a research tool for investigating children'S
Wlderstanding of the meaning of a sentence. It typically involves two experimenters (see
McKee and Crain 1985 and Crain and Thornton 1998). One experimenter acts out stories
in front of the child, using toy characters and props. The second experimenter
manipulates a puppet who watches the stories along with the child. At the end of the
story, the puppet tells what he thinks happened in the story. The puppet's statements are
prefaced by a review of the characters (e.g .• «That was a story about . .. ») and an
indication that the target statement is forthcoming (e.g., d know what happened in the
story ... »), The child's task is to decide whether the puppet «said the right tbing» . If so,
the child rewards the puppet with a coin; if the puppet's description is not what happened
) We can view g{a, b} as an abstract object which is derived applying the function g (the group
forming function) to the set {a, b} and we can read g{a, b} as' the group formed by a and b'. To explain
why the group reading is not available for complex NPs which include disjunction, we could argue that the
function g is only defined if ilpplied to an object like (a, b), wh~rcas the denotation of iI coordinalc NPs
containing the disjunction operator is a different set, somcthing like {{a, b}, a, b}.
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in the story, then the child gives the puppet a reward of lesser value, as a 'reminder' to pay
closer attention. Whenever a child makes a negative judgement, the experimenter asks the
child «what really happened» in the story. The child's explanation is recorded and
anaJyzed, to ensure that the child is rejecting the puppet's statements for the right reasons.
To make the generic reading salient, the linguistic introduction to the target sentences

was designed to make it clear that the sentence was not a mece description of what
happened. Before each of the target sentences, the puppet said: <d learned something in
!hi5 story ... ». 4
3.1.

Tbe Distributive Reading

This experiment was designed to investigate two aspects of child language . First, we
wanted to see if children are able to assign the inclusive~or reading to the disjunctive
operator, or. As argued above, the relevant conversational implicature is expected to be
cancelled in the present study, due to the (generic) meaning conveyed by the modal verb
can. Second, we wanted to determine if children distinguish and from or. To address
these questions, sixteen children, ranging in age from 4.1.22 to 6.1.25 (mean age
4.11 .24), were interviewed. Each child was presented with 12 sentences, in two sessions.
The sentences included three wann~ups. three fillers, three sentences which were true
only under the inclusive-or reading of disjunction, two sentences which were true under
the exclusive~or reading, and one sentence containing the coordinating conjunction and.
Consider first the availability of the inclusive~or reading. Each child encountered
three sentences (for a total of 47 trials~ which were true only under the inclusive~or
reading of disjunction. Children correctly answered «Yes» to these sentences 40 times
out of 47 trials (85%).6 Three control sentences were included to determine if children
distinguish between and and or. First, each child was presented with two sentences
containing the disjunction operator, or, in a situation in which only one of the characters
was able to perform the action described in the sentence. If cbildren interpreted or as and,
they should have rejected these sentences. However, children correctly answered «Yes»
18 times out of 28 trials (64%).7 In addition, children were presented with one sentence
(15 trails) containing and in a context in which only one ofthe two conjuncts was true.
Children correctly rejected this control sentence, 13 times (87%), again revealing a
distinction in their grammars between or and and.
In short. the present experiment provides evidence that children's interpretation of
disjunction conforms to classical logic. Other support for this claim can be found in
, On the importance of providing a linguistic antecedent in an experiment, see Crain iUld Thornton

(1998).
J One child did not want to participate in the second session, so the only data we have for this
child are the two sentences of this kind presented in the fim session.
, This level of accuracy is sl ightly lower than the percentage which is usually assumed to be
meaningful when running a Truth Value Judgement task (see Crain and Thornton 1998). But since the
experiment was investigating the felicity of a sentence rather than its grammaticality, we think the finding
is significanl
7This percentage is al", lower than expected (see footnote 6). In the present case, however. there
may be a IU50n why children did nol consistently accept a semence like A or B can do X in a situation in
which only one oflhe two characters could perfonn the described action. This might indicate an infelicity
in mentioning a second character which clearly failed to perfonn the action mentioned in the sentence.
Braine and Rumain (1981) found a similar pattern in their Experiment J and interpret their data along the
Wile lines.
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recent studies by Chierchia et al. (1998) and Gualmini, Crain and Meroni (2000), using
different materials and with support from extralinguistic context (e.g., the Prediction
Mode). In the present study, by contrast, the inclusive-or interpretation of disjunction is
not induced because of the extralinguistic setting, but rather because the modal verb can
is assigned a generic interpretation that renders conversational implicatures ineffective.
Finally, the findings present additional evidence that young children distinguish and and
or. This finding challenges the claim by Paris (1973).
The next topic is the results from English-speaking adults. Our prediction was that
adults too would understand the logical connective, or, in the truth conditions ascribed to
it by standard logic. This expectation was not entirely borne out, however. Like children,
the adult subjects were each presented with three sentences (for a total of 57 trials) which
were true only under the inclusive-or reading of disjunction. As expected, adults
responded «Yes») to these sentences the majority of the time, on 49 trials (86%).
However, adults provided unexpected responses to the control sentences which were
designed to see if subjects distinguish or and and. Again, there were two sentences in
contexts in which only one of the two characters could perform the described action. As
we saw, children consistently accepted the control sentences in such contexts. However,
the adult subjects rejected these sentences 100% of the time. Of course, adults correctly
rejected the sentence containing and 100% of the time when only one of the two
conjuncts was true.
Paradoxically, the one unexpected fmding from this study was from adults who, at
fIrst glance, seem to fail to distinguish between and and or. Before we jump to this
conclusion, however, a different explanation should be pursued. In our view, the main
reason adults consistently rejected a disjunction when only one of the characters could
perform the described action was due to conversational implicatures. Adults and children
were presented with a story in which one character could perform a certain action but in
which another character could not perfonn the same action. Describing this situation with
a disjunction, saying that «x or Y can do Z» when only X did Z, is misleading because,
in this case, disjunction is also consistent with an interpretation which is false. A more
cooperative description would be «X can do Z)).
If this interpretation of the finding is on the right track, then the experimental
results challenge any account which defmes the meaning of connectives in natural
languages on the basis of their entailment relations, a position which Braine and Rumain
(1983) attribute to Pelletier (1977). For example, p entails p or q. However, adult
speakers of English do not accept a sentence like «x or Y can do Z)) in a situation in
which only «x can do Z» is true.
In the next experiment, we turn to children's responses to sentences with
disjunction in circumstances that support a collective reading, but not the distributive
reading.

3.2.

The collective reading

In the second experiment the experimental contexts made sentences with the operator or
true on collective interpretation, but false on the distributive interpretation. If children or
adults allow a collective reading of disjunction, therefore, they should respond
affirmatively. However, if this reading is ruled out by the granunar, then subjects should
respond negatively. To ilIustrate,let us describe a typical trial, which consisted of a story
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that was acted out in front of the child. [0 one story, Tigger and Poob Bear were driving a
jeep in the desert. Then, one of the tires of the jeep went flat. Tigger and then Pooh Bear
each took a turn trying to fix the flat tire, but neither of them CQuld take the wheel off,
because it was on too tightly. They then decided to join forces and, together, they
successfully removed the tire. At this point. the test sentence was presented:

(7)

Tigger or Pooh Bear can take off the wheel.
Notice that in the same situation a sentence like:

(8)

Tigger and Pooh Bear can take off the wheel.

would be perfectly granunatical. Therefore, in addition to assessing the availability of the
collective reading of disjunction, the present experiment provides another test of
children's ability to distinguish between or and and.
Thirteen children who were tested in the first experiment also participated in this
second experiment. The children ranged in age from 4.01 .22 to 6.01.25 (mean age: 5.01).
Each child was presented with two sentences with disjunction and two sentences with
conjunction, but the contexts were always the same, making the test sentences true on the
collective reading. but false on the distributive reading. Out of the 26 trials with
conjunction. as in (8), children correctly responded «Yes» 25 times (96%). By contrast.
out of the 26 trials with disjunction, children correctly responded (No» only 13 times (50
%). A control group of 16 adult native speakers of English were tested. Adults correctly
responded «Yes» 28 times out of32 trials with conjunction (88%) and they produced the
expected negative response to the 32 sentences with disjunction on every occasion.
Concerning the distinction between and and or in child language, the present
results add to the finding of the experiment described in section 3.1, as well as the fmding
reported in Gualmini et aI. (2000). showing that young children distinguish between the
logical connectives and and or, contrary to the claim by Paris (1973). As for the
availability of the collective interpretation of disjunction, the data require careful
consideration. In particular we need to explain the difference between children and
adults. One aspect of children's responses is relevant here. Although, the overall level of
acceptance was 50%, this figure is misleading. Only five children responded both «Yes»
and ((No». Four of the remaining eight children always rejected the sentences with
disjW1ction in the present experiment, exactly like adults, whereas the other four children
consistently accepted them.
There are two possible explanations of the findings. First, some children might
not have acquired knowledge of the relevant properties of the collective interpretation of
verb phrases, namely that it is associated with a set containing groups rather than
pluralities. Second, it is conceivable that children have acquired the relevant properties of
collective readings but the level of acceptance of the inclusive-or reading of disjunction
reflects a different phenomenon, namely some artifact of the experiment.
Further investigation is required to identify the exact reason for children'S
responses. In our view, the second hypothesis is more likely. First, when asked to
evaluate sentences with a disjunctive NP many children said the puppet was right but
went on to make the unsolicited comment that the two characters could perform the
depicted action only together, whereas the same did not happen in the trials with
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conjoined NPs. Second, some of the children may not really understand the collective
reading, simply because it is difficult to determine if an event is collective or not. It is
worth noting, in this regard, that children in another study, by Avrutin and Thornton
(1994), also were judged to lack adult-like understanding of the collective interpretation
of a verb phrase.

4.

Conclusi!lD

This paper presented the results of two experiments using the Truth Value Judgement
task. One experiment was designed to test the availability of the inclusive-or reading of
disjunction in generic sentences. The experiment attempted to cancel conversational
implicatures in a different way than in the studies by Chierchia et aI. (1998) and Gualmini
et aJ. (2000). The results of this experiment highlight two aspects of child grammar. First,
children can consistently access the inclusive~or reading of disjunction. Second, children
know that and and or are associated with different truth-conditions.
The results of the second experiment point to a need for further research to
understand children's comprehension of collective versus distributive readings. Even at
this preliminary stage, though, we have established the distinction between contexts that
raise or erase conversational implicatures, and semantic principles that have similar
consequences for interpretation. The responses by adults support the proposed extension
of the Modularity Matching Model to the semantics/pragmatics interface: a purely
grammatical principle can eliminate one of the readings associated with a lexical item,
before pragmatic principles come into play. The interpretation of children's responses is
not so straightforward. however. It is possible that children failed to appreciate that the
event they witnessed could take place only if the two characters performed an action
together.
Extending the assumptions of the Modularity Matching Model to the
semantics/pragmatics interface yields an interesting prediction. If we replicated the
experiment described in section 3.2 in the implicatw::e-erasing context used by Chierchia
et a1. (1998) we should fail to fmd any significant change in the rate of acceptance o( the
inclusive-or reading of disjunction. If the inclusive-or reading is ruled out by
grammatical principles, then using the sentence in a context that (ordinarily) cancels
implicatures (e.g., the Prediction Mode) should not affect its interpretation. This
prediction follows from the assumption that the language processing system has a
modular architecture and that principles at higber level (such as conversational
implicatures) can only select among the alternatives proposed by the lower level. The
context cannot make available an interpretation that is not already licensed by the
grarrunar.
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